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Social neuroscience has been enormously successful and is making major contributions to fields ranging
from psychiatry to economics. Yet deep and interesting conceptual challenges abound. Is social information
processing domain specific? Is it universal or susceptible to individual differences and effects of culture? Are
there uniquely human social cognitive abilities? What is the ‘‘social brain,’’ and how do we map social
psychological processes onto it? Animal models together with fMRI and other cognitive neuroscience
approaches in humans are providing an unprecedented level of detail and many surprising results. It may
well be that social neuroscience in the near future will give us an entirely new view of who we are, how we
evolved, and what might be in store for the future of our species.Introduction
Social neuroscience was first coined as a term and proposed
as a field in 1992, at the beginning of the Decade of the Brain,
in an article that stressed the need to apply an interdisciplinary,
multilevel analysis to understanding social behavior and cogni-
tion (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992). Yet at that time, one of the
major tools available to study the social brain—neuroimaging—
was limited. Following earlier studies using positron emission
tomography (PET), it took nearly a decade for functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to establish itself as the
most prominent approach in social neuroscience. Work in the
1990s instead progressed along diverse lines, including
a variety of seminal studies on affiliative behaviors in animals
as well as on issues related to clinical health and socioemo-
tional processes. Some of the most influential studies were
based on focal brain lesions in both monkeys and humans,
but these studies could only be carried out by relatively few
laboratories. There was also still a substantial public resistance
to the very idea of social neuroscience or indeed any approach
that people associated with sociobiology. Not surprisingly, at
that time genetics somewhat overshadowed neuroscience,
both in terms of the science done and in terms of the socioeth-
ical objections to it.
That has changed. Although it took several more years for
fMRI studies to follow the call of Cacioppo and Berntson’s initial
article (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992), the year 2001 saw the
publication of the first edited volume on social neuroscience
led by the same authors (Cacioppo et al., 2001), as well as
a seminal article outlining explicit synergies between cognitive
neuroscience (by then well defined) and social psychology
(Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001). By now everyone is aware
that the neurobiology of social behavior (henceforth, ‘‘social
neuroscience’’) is a burgeoning field: there are numerous confer-
ences, calls for funding proposals, even new journals and socie-
ties attesting to its popularity (for instance, the new society for
social neuroscience, www.s4sn.org). Its impact has spread
from social psychology (Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001) to the752 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.study of decision making (as in the investigation of social factors
in neuroeconomics) (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Camerer, 2007) to
the study of numerous psychiatric illnesses (from autism to
schizophrenia) (Cacioppo et al., 2007) and highlighted a number
of animal models (see Sokolowski [this issue of Neuron]). So
dominant is the approach in the behavioral and social sciences,
in particular the use of fMRI to probe cognitive processes, that it
threatens to displace traditional behavioral economics, social
psychology, and even aspects of political science.
Many of the foundational issues that the field debated over
a decade ago still remain, and new ones have been added
(Adolphs, 2003b). These issues are challenges not only for
the study of social cognition, but important for cognitive neuro-
science generally and critical to our understanding of the
human mind in both health and disease. It is probably fair to
say that the technical advances and the sheer accrual of data
are rapidly outstripping our ability to understand it all. In
response to the ethical concerns around cognitive neurosci-
ence in general, there is now a society for neuroethics. In
response to methodological concerns about the statistical anal-
yses associated with fMRI, there is now a healthy corpus of
writings (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Vul et al., 2009) as
well as numerous responses and universal awareness of the
issues. But conceptual challenges remain often unarticulated,
a situation exacerbated by the breakneck pace of research,
which leaves one little time to step back from the deluge of
weekly papers to read and reflect on the questions. I step
back here and highlight some of the key questions, important
approaches, and conceptual challenges in social neuroscience.
Many of them make direct contact with the other reviews in this
special issue. While I provide numerous examples from the
literature throughout, this is not intended to be an in-depth
review of social neuroscience (Adolphs, 2003a, 2009; Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Frith, 2007; Moll et al., 2005; Saxe, 2006b)
but rather a more theoretically oriented discussion of its
conceptual foundations and challenges, with an emphasis on
studies in humans.
Table 1. Stages of Social Information Processing
Social Perception Social Cognition Social Regulation
pheromones theory of mind cognitive control
face perception simulation emotion regulation
speech perception empathy monitoring/error correction
social touch social judgment self-reflection
biological motion moral judgment deception
Potential Attributes
fast inferential individual differences
automatic automatic controlled and effortful
implicit uniquely human uniquely human
domain specific context sensitive very context sensitive
labeled lines biased impaired in psychiatric illness
Three broad stages of processing outlined in the main text are provided
with some examples, and with some of the attributes and roles they are
often proposed to have.
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Social behavior is as ubiquitous as it is essential, since every
species has more than one of its kind and depends on others
of its kind. In a very broad sense, all life is social, a truism that
applies equally to phylogenetic observations as it does to
everyday life for Homo sapiens in particular. These consider-
ations threaten to equate social neuroscience with all of neuro-
science, with nothing proprietary left to define the field. However,
a quick sketch of how socially relevant information is processed
begins to show how social neuroscience is distinct and sets the
stage for the conceptual themes and challenges we review here.
There are three broad stages of social information processing to
briefly consider: perception, cognition, and regulation (Table 1).
We can begin with the transduction and perception of social
information. Detection of pheromones, somatosensation of
affective touch, auditory perception of conspecific songs in
passerine songbirds, and visual perception of faces in sheep
and primates, to name just a few examples, all draw upon
features of perception in general. But there is already a difference
from perception in general here: at least some aspects of these
examples of social perception feature ‘‘labeled line’’ pathways,
or ‘‘modular’’ central representations, that are dedicated to
that particular type of stimulus. Pheromonal communication
through the vomeronasal organ is perhaps the clearest example,
since this entire sensory modality is specialized for social infor-
mation beginning at the periphery (Insel and Fernald, 2004). A
good analogous example in insects is the recent discovery that
11-cis-vaccenyl acetate is a male-specific pheromone for
aggressive behavior in flies, acting through an equally specific
olfactory receptor (Wang and Anderson, 2010). A similarly
specific molecule and its neural signature in the olfactory system
has been identified in mice, in this case for mate attractiveness
through the molecule’s presence in mouse urine (Lin et al.,
2005). And there is a plethora of model systems in which the
olfactory signature of a conspecific is linked in memory to
specific social behaviors, such as the well-known affiliative
behaviors of prairie voles (Insel and Young, 2001) and bonding
between sheep ewes and their offspring triggered by parturition
(Broad et al., 2006). These last two examples involve actions of
the peptide oxytocin, which modulates human social behavior
(Kosfeld et al., 2005) and neural responses (Baumgartner et al.,
2008) as well and is a current hot topic of social neuroscience
investigations. While the role of pheromones in human social
behavior is likely to be modest compared to other sensory
modalities, and the detailed mechanisms remain debated, there
is a growing set of behavioral and neuroimaging studies exam-
ining this topic as well. Many of these instances are likely
mediated through themain olfactory system rather than the vom-
eronasal system, which is also a major conduit for social percep-
tion across a wide range of mammalian species (Sanchez-
Andrade and Kendrick, 2009). The existence of such ‘‘labeled
lines’’ for social perception is probably driven by the fact that
the stimuli are generated by conspecifics, decoupling them
from other environmental stimuli and facilitating the coevolution
of dedicated channels for social communication.
Complex patterned stimuli that are ingredients in social
communication, while not so specialized in their perception at
the very periphery, also feature specialized central systems fortheir perception and representation: song-selective neurons in
the forebrain nuclei of passerine songbirds (Margoliash, 1983)
and face-selective neurons in the temporal lobe of primates
(Tsao et al., 2006) and sheep (Tate et al., 2006) are examples.
As with the social perception of odorants, these are beautiful
model systems for studying sensory processing and perception
for social behaviors. Once again, they have human analogs:
for instance, a specific region in the ventral temporal lobe of
humans that is selectively activated by the sight of faces
(Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997), a topic we take
up in more detail below.
Social touch is an interesting somatosensory channel that has
received some recent attention in studies in humans. Beginning
with observations of patients with rare demyelinating diseases
who could perceive a caress as pleasurable but fail to localize
it on their body (Olausson et al., 2002), it has become clear
that there are labeled-line pathways from the skin to regions
such as insular cortex that transmit affective properties of social
touch (Lo¨ken et al., 2009; Morrison, 2009). This modality is ripe
for deeper investigation in other species, especially given the
well-known importance of social touch for normal development
in mammals (Francis et al., 1999; Harlow and Harlow, 1962)
and the importance of social grooming for maintaining social
relationships in nonhuman primates (Dunbar, 2008).
Thus, already at the level of perception (for pheromones and
affective touch, already at the level of sensory transduction),
there is evidence for domain-specific processing of social infor-
mation. There remain debates over how exactly to describe such
specialized processing—does it meet criteria for Fodor-style
modularity (Fodor, 1983)? Is it domain specific (specialized for
a circumscribed class of stimuli) or process specific (specialized
for a particular type of computation) (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000;
Yovel and Kanwisher, 2004)? In terms of its neural substrates:
are there regions and systems neuroanatomically specialized
for social perception? At the most peripheral levels, the answer
seems to be a clear ‘‘yes.’’ There are specialized transduction
channels for social communication as noted above. On the other
hand, there are narrow-bandwidth channels for many stimuli;Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 753
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feed processing channels that are to some degree segregated
both functionally and anatomically. So while social perception
may occupy some unique channels for sensory processing, the
fact that it does so is not unique.
Social Cognition
Social cognition may be another matter. Once we go beyond
processing driven primarily by the sensory input and consider
the attributions and inferences that we make in order to
construct a richer representation of the distal stimuli that caused
the sensory input, social cognition recruits processes that seem
to find no analog in nonsocial cognition. We quickly recognize
how somebody is feeling, what they intend to do, and whether
they are friend or foe by making such inferences. Indeed, we
do it so compulsively and automatically (as borne out in our
propensity to anthropomorphize), that it is sometimes difficult
to appreciate the rich elaboration that is required. An important
topic in social psychology that blossomed in the 1980s (Fiske
and Taylor, 1984), social cognition features a very rich repertoire
of attributions that make us see the world imbued with social
meaning. When we perceive a facial expression in a particular
context, we not only see the face and the context, but immedi-
ately generate knowledge about something that we can never
observe directly: the mind of another person. So-called ‘‘theory
of mind’’ is a large topic in social neuroscience, with a huge liter-
ature questioning whether it exists in animals other than humans
(Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Premack and Woodruff, 1978;
Tomasello et al., 2003), showing how to study it using fMRI (Saxe,
2006b), and demonstrating its impairment in autism (Baron-
Cohen, 1997; Frith, 2001); we take it up in more detail below.
Of course, inference and filling-in are commonplace in sensory
processing—as anybodywho has seen the ‘‘edges’’ in an illusory
Kanisza triangle will testify. But in all those cases, what is filled in
is more of the same stuff, just extended in space and/or time.
What is filled in for the case of social cognition is another kind
of stuff: we see a person’s face, and we fill in the unobservable
psychological states of a person by which we attempt to predict
their behavior. The case is also disanalogous to filling-in with
causal perception. We do project the future trajectories of
objects, and we fill in their physical properties from which we
infer such projections. But it is only when we engage with social
stimuli that mental attributes are inferred, typically with
a concomitant sense of reciprocal involvement and normative
evaluation that finds no obvious parallel in nonsocial stimuli.
Plausibly, there are levels of intermediate inference between
the physical causal attributions we make and the full-blown attri-
butions of another conscious mind—such as attributions of
agency and animacy that apply to a wide range of other organ-
isms and that likely emerge earlier in development and
phylogeny than do attributions of minds as such.
Perhaps one of the best examples of a social inferential
process is the currently hot topic of action perception through
simulation, which is thought also to be related to emotional simu-
lation in empathy (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). Intentional
actions can be distinguished from nonintentional actions in
several primate species (Wood et al., 2007), and primates have
so-called ‘‘mirror neurons’’ that respond both when the animal
executes a goal-directed action and when it observes someone754 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.else perform that same action (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
This mechanism may underpin aspects of social learning and
constitute a key component of social cognition (Gallese et al.,
2004). Again, in the absence of anthropomorphizing, it finds no
clear analog in nonsocial cognition.
Of course, one can argue with this view of social cognition as
special and see the story instead much like what I sketched for
social perception: inference, attribution, and filling-in are of
a special sort for social stimuli, but the general computational
process is ubiquitous in how the brain processes information.
Perhaps the most decisive evidence in favor of the view that
social cognition is special is neurobiological: different brain
structures are involved. Social neuroscience has now identified
a network of structures that all seem to come into play dispropor-
tionately when we think about other people, as opposed to when
we think about nonsocial objects: it includes medial prefrontal
cortex, sectors of the temporoparietal junction, regions contain-
ing ‘‘mirror neurons,’’ and others (Adolphs, 2009; Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006b). While the precise anatomical delinea-
tion of this so-called ‘‘social brain’’ remains a topic of intense
investigation (one which we discuss further below), its fuzziness
does not detract from its prominent role in carving out what is
special about social cognition (indeed, some recent proposals
argue that this will be the basis for delineating social cognition
as distinct [Mitchell, 2009]).
Social Regulation
Finally, we also are able to step back and regulate and control
our thinking and our behavior using metacognitive abilities.
This certainly plays a large role in human social behavior but
does not appear to be unique to the social domain, since we
have to reflect on all aspects of our behavior and control all kinds
of thoughts and actions all the time. It is, however, quite possible
that the evolution of our extensive cognitive control, especially in
relation to emotion regulation, was driven by social factors—
notably, the advantage in being able to deceive others. I mention
regulation here primarily for completeness and because of the
noted likely importance especially of emotion regulation, a topic
of great interest to those studying social development and also
a major contributor to social dysfunction when impaired (David-
son, 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005).
This brings us back to a question related to the one we posed
at the beginning of our discussion concerning the boundaries of
the field of social neuroscience: is all social processing
emotional? The learning and regulation of emotions features
very prominently in social neuroscience (Olsson and Ochsner,
2008). Recognition of emotions is a very popular topic of study
and constitutes an important aspect of social communication.
And the so-called social or moral emotions are precisely that—
they arise only in a social context. It may be that the complexity
of the social environment has driven the emergence of more
finely differentiated emotions, and those are the ones we typi-
cally have names for and consider emotions, even though other
states such as hunger and thirst play a similar functional role and
share many of the same neural substrates (Panksepp, 1998).
While emotion and social cognition are closely intertwined, it
also seems that many aspects of social cognition do not involve
blatant emotional reactions—we can recognize the identity of
a person from their face or decide on a particular strategic
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emotions. An important question for the future is therefore
why, when, and how emotion participates in social cognition.
This brief review of some of the broad components of social
information processing argues that the brain treats social stimuli
inmanyways differently from nonsocial stimuli and suggests that
social neuroscience studies a select set of processes that are
distinguished computationally, in terms of their content, and in
terms of their underlying neural substrates. It also points to ques-
tions we should ask if we want to conduct investigations in social
neuroscience. I discuss several conceptual issues further below
but first briefly consider an overarching question regarding why
anybody would find this interesting in the first place.
Why Is It Interesting and Important to Investigate
Social Neuroscience?
Any researcher in the field should be able to provide an answer to
the question of this section and defend it; any student in the field
or thinking about going into the field should be asking the ques-
tion. In fact, answers are easy to come by.
Clinical Relevance and Individual Differences
One answer arguably underpinning most funding to the field is
that it is of patent clinical relevance, and there are many exam-
ples ranging frompsychiatric and neurological disease to healthy
adolescent development and aging. It will be particularly impor-
tant to trace impairments in social functioning to deficits in
specific stages of social information processing. Looking back
at the stages of processing we briefly outlined above, we can
ask the question to what extent a psychiatric illness might result
from impaired perception, cognition, or regulation. For instance,
many mood disorders are thought prominently to feature
dysfunction in emotion regulation, and there are important
discussions about whether autism might result from sensory
processing impairments or from motivational impairments (the
latter, in the context of a developmental disorder such as autism,
may in turn give rise to the former).
The diseases that have been highlighted include those for
which social dysfunction is part of the diagnostic criteria, such
as autism or social phobia, but in fact nearly every psychiatric
illness listed in DSM-IV includes aspects of social functioning
as a core component of real-life impairments. Mood disorders
in general severely affect our ability to interact with other people,
as do schizophrenia, personality disorders, drug addiction, and
anorexia nervosa. Neurological diseases are also fast to list off:
lesions in many brain structures impair social cognition, with
perhaps the largest population consisting of those with damage
to the prefrontal cortex arising from traumatic brain injury, e.g.,
through automobile accidents (Anderson et al., 1999). Neurode-
generative disorders such as Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, and
Alzheimer’s disease all impact social functioning, in some cases
by disproportionately damaging regions of the ‘‘social brain’’
(e.g., in frontotemporal dementia [Kipps et al., 2009]). Many of
the psychiatric diseases are on a continuum with variability in
the healthy population, and overlapping sets of neural structures
may be responsible for individual differences and diseases of
social cognition. To give just one intriguing recent finding in
this vein: using a neuroeconomics approach, it was found that
people with borderline personality disorder cooperate less withothers and that this is correlated significantly with abnormal
activation of the insula to the perception of social signals
(King-Casas et al., 2008).
These broad perspectives are exciting, because they suggest
that we can understand illness in part through understanding
normal individual differences and development—or, indeed,
well-justified animal models. They are also theoretically exciting
because they raise questions about the source and adaptive
value of such variability. Is there an advantage to have evolved
considerable variability in social behavior? Do other animals
show similar variability and similar disorders of social behavior?
These questions are particularly acute these days because there
is some evidence that certain diseases of social cognition (e.g.,
autism) may be increasing in prevalence and because it is clear
that the modern-day social environment of humans is very
different from the social environment in which we evolved. To
what extent is the human ‘‘social brain’’ maladapted for the
modern social environment we have created for it?
Collective Behavior
This brings us to a second answer to our original question. Social
neuroscience is interesting and important for understanding
collective human behavior, ranging from the positive (coopera-
tion and altruism) to the negative (conflict and war). This angle
is of particular interest to anthropologists, economists, and
comparative biologists. From a comparative perspective, it is
intriguing to consider the evolution of collective behavior. There
are many examples where behaviors at the level of individuals
clearly contribute to collective survival, such as in schools of
fish or flocks of birds. These behaviors can bemodeled by rather
simple local rules implemented in the brains of the individual that,
once selected, render the behavior of the entire group adaptive
(Couzin, 2009).
However, much group behavior features a fundamental
conflict between competition for limited resources (food, mates)
and cooperation needed to compete on a larger scale. While it
might seem that within-group cooperation and between-group
competition should be the stable solution, within-group cooper-
ation is always susceptible to individual free riders that take
advantage of the group’s resources at the expense of other
group members. Theoretical, simulation-based, and empirical
studies have all provided strong reasons for thinking that
cooperation in humans is complex and polymorphic. Popula-
tions of reasonably large size appear to evolve toward a dynamic
mixture of types of individuals—some cooperate, some defect,
and some are intermediate (Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). This
picture fits well with empirical data as well (Kurzban and Houser,
2005) and alsowith emphasis on individual differences. Indeed, it
is likely that it will be linked in part to particular genetic polymor-
phisms that underlie these individual differences. One ingredient
of particular recent interest is the finding that costly (altruistic)
punishment to enforce cooperation can emerge and stabilize
cooperation, likely an ingredient essential to many aspects of
large-scale human social behavior (Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2002).
The new field of neuroeconomics has gathered tremendous
momentum and excitement in identifying the neural mechanisms
behind collective behaviors such as cooperation, punishment,
and altruism using tools from economic decision theoryNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 755
Figure 1. Two Eusocial Species
Eusociality refers to the rigid and highly organized colonial behavior seen in some insect species, such as ants, termites, and bees. It involves overlapping gener-
ations, cooperative care of the young, and specialized castes, including allocation of reproduction. On the face of it, its evolution seems impossible, since an
individual’s advantage in passing on its genes should always trump its eusocial role as a nonreproductive caste. However, some insects with haplodiploidy (where
the number of chromosome copies determines sex) feature the interesting phenomenon that an individual may be genetically more closely related to a sibling than
to their offspring, raising the possibility that kin selection can drive the evolution of eusociality. However, even this does not seem enough, and group selection
(i.e., at the level of the entire colony) appears to be necessary and may in fact be the key driving force for the emergence of eusociality (Wilson and Ho¨lldobler,
2005). This requires several convergent criteria that favor cooperation and can be considered a highly advanced transition into a tightly colonial existence often
called a ‘‘superorganism.’’
Evidently, it is very difficult for eusociality to arise, but once established it is extremely successful and stable. For instance, out of the over 2600 families of artho-
pods, only 15 contain eusocial species. Ants and termites comprise only about 2% of insect species, yet they constitute over half of the globe’s total insect
biomass. In vertebrates, eusociality only exists in two species of mammals, both mole rats found in Africa. Intriguingly, some of the conditions for the evolution
of eusociality and for the highly cooperative behaviors of eusocial species have been suggested to be present in humans as well, raising the possibility that group
selection and a transition to a different form of collective existence may be at play in our species as well.
(Left) The nakedmole rat,Heterocephalus glaber, one of only two eusocial mammals. These rodents have social structures similar to those seen in bees and ants:
a single breeding queen and division of sexual reproduction and labor among all the individuals within a subterranean hive. Nakedmole rats cannot live for long left
on their own and require the specialized cooperative behaviors of other members of their colony to thermoregulate, obtain food, and defend against potential
predators. They are also fascinating because they have the longest lifespan of any rodent and a surprisingly large brain specialized for somatosensory and olfac-
tory processing (image by Rochelle Buffenstein) (Jarvis and Sherman, 2002).
(Right) Excavation of a leafcutter ant nest by Bert Ho¨lldobbler and colleagues, showing the intricate way in which this ‘‘superorganism’’ has structured its
environment. Photo by Wolfgang Thaler from Ho¨lldobler and Wilson (2008).
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et al., 2008). For instance, the above-mentioned phenomenon
of altruistic punishment has been studied using neuroimaging,
with the finding that the ventral striatum is activated when third
parties punish what they view as unfair behavior in others. This
result can be interpreted as resulting from our motivation toward
altruistic punishment by the prospect of feeling satisfaction,
a mechanism analogous to that which motivates behavior to
obtain expected rewards (deQuervain et al., 2004). A related
earlier finding showed that unfair offers made in a trust game re-
sulted in rejections behaviorally and were correlated with activa-
tion of the insula, a region known to represent pain and disgust,
again suggesting that basic reward-related processes also
come into play during social interactions (Sanfey et al., 2003).
Similarities in the processes behind reward learning and social
interactions have been found in many other studies as well: for
instance, temporal shifts in anticipating trusting behavior mirror
those seen in anticipating rewards (King-Casas et al., 2005).
Neuroeconomic approaches to social neuroscience are forging
a major quantitative contribution to the investigation of psychi-
atric illness and individual differences that we noted in the
previous section as well. For example, specific neural signatures
have been identified in the brains of people with autism when756 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.they engage in an economic trust game (Chiu et al., 2008), and
individual differences in altruistic behavior are correlated with
individual differences in activity within dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, a region known to be important for cognitive control
(Hare et al., 2009; Knoch et al., 2009).
If the advantage to cooperate is large, such as in species
where group selection may operate, eusocial behavior can
emerge: the highly organized division of labor and reproduction
seen in species such as ants, termites, and bees (Figure 1). Only
two species of mole rats, a fossorial rodent, have evolved euso-
cial behavior in mammals, possibly due to the very specialized
adaptive challenges in securing a stable food supply in those
species. Other mammalian species have instead evolved more
flexible and less stable forms of collective behavior—in primates,
ones that involve deception and strategic behavior. It is an inter-
esting question whether human evolution would eventually result
either in extinction of our species or in a species with stably
cooperative social behaviors reminiscent of eusociality.
Insights for Basic Research
There are also two less applied and more basic reasons why it is
interesting and important to do experiments in social neurosci-
ence. One valid reason is that the study of social information pro-
cessing will inform cognitive neuroscience, and neurobiology,
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is fascinating to ask how and why the humanmind appears to be
so different from theminds of all other animals—how andwhy do
we have language, self-reflection, and conscious experience in
a way other animals very likely do not (see Byrne and Bates
[this issue of Neuron])? Often implicit here is the assumption
that whatever it is that is ‘‘uniquely human,’’ it has to do with
our social cognitive abilities. At the heart of the puzzle is our
ability to step back from the current experience of the world in
which we are caught up, and by doing so to generate a concept
of the distinction between subject and object, betweenmind and
world. This ability is presumably also related to our concern for
ourselves and our species, because it gives us a glimpse into
our mortality. It seems unlikely that any other animal feels
a need for religion or can contemplate suicide, just as it seems
unlikely that any other animal can worry about the future of its
species, let alone attempt to intervene in a directed way; on
the other hand, evidence to support our intuitions in this regard
is extraordinarily difficult to come by. Answers to this aspect of
social neuroscience will recast our understanding of who we
are, where we came from, and what we might become.
Finally, it would be an omission not to acknowledge that of
course understanding social behavior requires much more
than cognitive neuroscience, more than neurobiology, and
indeed more than biology. This realization is one reason the field
is so exciting: it is vibrantly interdisciplinary. We can ask ques-
tions from within philosophy, we can investigate social behavior
with models that require no biological data at all, and we can
engineer social robots. Social neuroscience is not, and cannot
be, the only way to investigate social behavior; but it will be indis-
pensable if we want to uncover the underlying mechanisms,
understand how individual differences arise, and formulate tar-
geted interventions for treating disease.
Current Themes and Debates
I will consider primarily one overarching question, which spawns
several subquestions, each of them topics and challenges in
social neuroscience. The question is: What is the mapping
between brain structures and psychological processes?
For behavioral, systems, and cognitive neuroscience, this is
arguably the key question of all. Parts of it are straightforward
to address, other parts are extremely difficult. A starting point
for providing an answer is historical. When Franz Josef Gall
conceived of phrenology in the late 1700s, it became wildly
and derisively popular in America in the early 1800s. One reason
for the popularity is that it provided a concrete basis for
psychology—it carved the mind up into neat little modules
(27 of them, to be exact) and put them in their place in the brain
(Gall’s magnum opus was a six-volume treatise on the idea pub-
lished between 1822 and 1825). Gall, Spurzheim, and their
followers argued that specific mental ‘‘organs’’ were localized
in specific brain regions (an extreme form of anatomical modu-
larity) and that, moreover, the degree of the mental ability or
propensity was directly related to the size of the responsible
brain region, something that could be inferred from palpating
the bumps on people’s skulls. While essentially every aspect of
phrenology was grossly incorrect in its details, the approach
was both attractive and in fact reasonable. What have welearned since then? I think there are two important lessons: first,
no single brain structure maps any central psychological
process we can conceive of, so it is a challenge to delineate
the neuroanatomy; second, it is unclear what psychological
processes to map in the first place.
What Are the Brain Structures?
It is easy to see that this question, while in principle straightfor-
ward, is empirically extraordinarily difficult. Concepts such as
the limbic system, and even otherwise well-regarded structures
such as the amygdala (Swanson and Petrovich, 1998), have
been cast into doubt as the right way to carve up the neural
tissue. The idea that there are specialized structures that consti-
tute a neural system for processing social information, the
so-called ‘‘social brain’’ (Brothers, 1990), has guided social
neuroscience studies in humans for the past two decades and
led to a collection of structures that regularly turn up in fMRI
studies of social cognition (Adolphs, 2009; Frith, 2007; Saxe,
2006b). Certain structures, such as medial prefrontal cortex,
turn up so reliably across studies and across different social
processes that they have been suggested by some as the neuro-
anatomical basis for specifying a proper domain for social
psychology (Mitchell, 2009). But the exercise of outlining sets
of structures in these studies has also begun to outline the chal-
lenges faced by any attempt to delineate neuroanatomically
a system for processing social information. The relevant brain
structures almost never map cleanly onto some macroscopic
region or Brodman Area. Instead, subregions, or subpopulations
of neurons within a region, will be the relevant level of grain.
Of course this progression is found within all cognitive neuro-
science, not only social neuroscience: regions originally postu-
lated to implement some process become progressively more
fractionated as techniques with better spatial and temporal reso-
lution arise. One recent example is a debate about the role of the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in subserving ‘‘theory of mind,’’
our ability to infer mental states from descriptions or observa-
tions of people’s actions. On one side of the debate it was
argued that the TPJ is selectively activated by theory-of-mind
tasks (Saxe and Powell, 2006); on the other side, it was argued
that this cortical region subserved a more general function in di-
recting attention (Mitchell, 2007). The debate is now partly
resolved by the finding that separate sectors of the TPJ sub-
served these two competing processes, so closely adjacent
that they could not be spatially resolved in the prior studies
(Scholz et al., 2009).
A similar fractionation into smaller regions has occurred for
many other structures, in the case of social cognition in particular
for regions of the prefrontal cortex (Barbey et al., 2009).
However, the felt need to map processes onto spatially defined
regions is giving way to multivoxel analyses, in which classifica-
tion algorithms from machine learning are applied across the
brain to decode processes without requiring clean spatial
segregation (Mur et al., 2009). This approach emphasizes how
the brain represents social information—the discriminations it
makes—without analyzing where (although decoding ap-
proaches can also be applied in a searchlight fashion to get
some spatial information). Even so, BOLD-fMRI will present
fundamental limitations that preclude findings such as those ob-
tained from single-unit electrophysiology. For instance, singleNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 757
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very high-level semantic knowledge about specific people: they
respond both when shown the face of a famous actor and also
when reading the actor’s name (Quian Quiroga et al., 2009). No
equivalent responses have yet been decoded using fMRI, and
given the very sparse and diverse neuronal response categories,
it seems unlikely that this can be achieved.
A conceptually difficult challenge is posed by the realization
that no brain structure, or subpopulation of neurons, operates
in isolation: we need to look at connected systems, whose
boundaries are even harder to define. A full understanding of
social information processing needs to acknowledge that the
processing is not only spatially distributed but also temporally
dispersed. This is now well known, although the bulk of lesion
and functional neuroimaging studies nonetheless still produce
data that are phrenological in flavor by concentrating on a single
region—often without even knowing from where it receives its
inputs nor what its projection field encompasses. The advent
of recent tools for exploring structural and functional connec-
tivity in the brain is having some effect on the data produced,
but it is still difficult to think about processes as implemented
in dynamic brain networks. On the other hand, descriptions in
this spirit have been around for quite a few years in computa-
tional neuroscience, and some empirical studies have generated
such a picture as well (Laurent, 2002). The problem has been
linking such dynamic network descriptions to processes at the
systems and cognitive level in mammals. Yet the need for
a distributed-systems approach is widely acknowledged; even
Leslie Brothers’ original description of the ‘‘social brain’’
(Brothers, 1990) outlined a set of distributed structures. A good
example of such a direction in social neuroscience is the
discovery of connected patches of temporal and frontal cortex
that process faces in primates (Moeller et al., 2008). Ultimately,
we will need an account of how such distributed neuronal repre-
sentations, at particular points in time, make explicit social infor-
mation that can be used to guide behavior.
An even more challenging question is whether the body and
the external environment participate in psychological processes,
taking social information processing outside of the brain alone.
There are patent ways in which this happens all the time, such
as when we use calculators, computers, or pencil-and-paper
scratchpads to offload information processing from brain to
environment. There are highly contentious ways in which (to
some thinkers) it is conceivable that conscious experience itself
somehow depends on more than just brain events (Clark and
Chalmers, 1998). In fact, there are reasonable arguments to think
that this is not only possible but necessary in order to ground the
otherwise meaningless events that happen in the brain: they
must be connected to the world in some way (the so-called clas-
sical ‘‘symbol-grounding problem’’). These discussions are
continuous with philosophy of mind and nonspecific to the social
domain; they constitute one of the most vigorous current lines of
research in ‘‘embodied cognition.’’ But they have been high-
lighted most visibly within social neuroscience. Investigations
of empathy, simulation, and the ‘‘mirror neuron system’’ all
postulate the engagement in an observer of some mechanisms
similar to those seen in another person, in virtue of which social
knowledge can be generated. The topic originated in the758 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.discovery of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ that respond both to the execution
and observation of a specific action in monkeys we noted earlier
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001) and were quickly adopted by cognitive
neuroscience to explain action observation more broadly in hu-
mans as well (Gallese and Goldman, 1999). While the original
focus, and still the best correspondence between monkey and
human data, is restricted to goal-directed actions (Rizzolatti
and Fabbri-Destro, 2008), social neuroscience studies using
fMRI in humans have considerably broadened the scope of
such mirroring mechanisms. For instance, human fMRI studies
have found that the observation and imitation of facial expres-
sions engage overlapping brain regions (Carr et al., 2003), that
observing a spouse experience pain activates regions overlap-
ping with those when one experiences pain oneself (Singer
et al., 2004), and that more generally the experience and recog-
nition of emotions draw on shared mechanisms (Bastiaansen
et al., 2009; Goldman and Sripada, 2005). A related thread, this
time originating from the perceptual end rather than the motor
end, is found in the idea that concepts are grounded in the
representations through which they were acquired (Barsalou,
1999). All of these accounts aim toward some kind of grounding
of central representations in more peripheral representa-
tions, whether sensory, motor, or both. Yet the literature on
‘‘embodied’’ or ‘‘situated’’ social cognition is typically rather
vague as to the exact claims.
Is embodiment thought to literally involve the body, or just
central representations of the body? Are perceptual or motoric
representations in the brain thought to be merely involved, or
constitutive of social cognition? These and other questions
require careful dissection, have engaged philosophers as well
as cognitive neuroscientists (Goldman and de Vignemont,
2009), and have to some extent continued a long-standing
debate about the very status of simulations (Saxe, 2005), reminis-
cent in many ways of the debate about the status of visual
imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2003). In both of those cases, some
thinkers find it intuitively plausible that there are central, often
amodal, representations that function much like sentences:
they represent by description (through the functional properties
of symbols). Other thinkers find it inconceivable how there could
be only such representations, and believe that, at some level, the
symbols need to merge with what they represent: they represent
by resemblance, much like a map. These issues hark back to
provocative proposals about how all abstract thought itself might
be based on bodily experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
There is also a more recent and specific debate about the
conditions under which simulation-like mechanisms of social
cognition might be deployed, as contrasted with so-called
‘‘theory-of-mind’’ mechanisms, which are presumed to generate
similar knowledge of other minds, but in a more deductive
fashion that does not require actual simulation. There is now
some acknowledgment that there are multiple mechanisms for
inferring the internal states of other people, relying on multiple
neural substrates, collectively referred to as ‘‘mentalizing’’ (Frith
and Frith, 2006). The extent to which ‘‘simulation’’ versus
‘‘theory’’-like mechanisms are used likely depends on the
context, with simulation-like mechanisms perhaps coming into
play predominantly when we observe those people with whom
we identify the most (Mitchell et al., 2006) or when we observe
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[2008] for the view that the simulation/theory distinction is
conceptual and unlikely to be resolved by data). That we would
engage simulation-like mechanisms when we observe those
peoplewho are themost similar or emotionally close to ourselves
makes intuitive sense and is borne out in studies of both pain
(Singer et al., 2004) and reward observation (Mobbs et al., 2009).
The general issue of the extent to which central cognition
draws upon motor and sensory representations in the brain, on
the body itself, and on the external environment may be espe-
cially acute in the case of social cognition for a number of
reasons (Adolphs, 2006). One reason is that the social environ-
ment (other people) is interactive: the simplest way to find out
about somebody else’s internal states is not necessarily through
detailed observation, but through simply asking them how they
feel or what they are thinking. A second reason may be that
social information is so rich, or so dynamic in nature, that
including the social environment in cognition makes possible
the rapid updating of social knowledge that would otherwise
be difficult to infer. To summarize this section: the ‘‘social brain’’
will likely need to include a widely distributed set of neural
regions, diverse sets of neuronal subpopulations within them,
and may encompass aspects of the body and the environment
in cognition.
What Are the Psychological Processes?
The second big challenge highlighted by our historical consider-
ation of phrenology above concerns the processes to be map-
ped themselves. The phrenologists came up with a list, mostly
out of their own intuition. Cognitive psychologists and cognitive
neuroscientists these days could produce lists of their own, and
they would include terms such as ‘‘edge detection,’’ ‘‘working
memory,’’ ‘‘error monitoring,’’ ‘‘decision value,’’ and so on.
Theywould spanmany levels, from early perception to high-level
self-reflection. There would be debate about the boundaries
between them. So how can we map onto the brain processes
whose computational nature and boundaries we do not yet
understand? This is a deep and acute problem that has been
realized for some time. In 1994, one of the first books illustrating
the beauty and seduction of the kinds of images generated by
neuroimaging noted tellingly, ‘‘The challenge for the future is to
understand at a deeper level the actual mental operations as-
signed to the various areas.. Before this goal can be achieved,
the experimental strategies used in PET studies must be refined
so that more detailed components of the process can be iso-
lated’’ (Posner and Raichle, 1994). This quote suggests an itera-
tive strategy whereby neuroscience data can inform us of the
psychological processes and whereby controlling and manipu-
lating specific parameters can allow isolation of such processes,
two key issues we comment on further below.
At a superordinate level, carving up social cognition has pro-
ceeded analogously to carving up cognition more generally. In
particular, a host of dual-process models have been put forth.
While these initially retained some resemblance to the original
idea of controlled versus automatic processing as proposed
from cognitive psychology (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), they
have taken on a bewildering plethora of attributes, including a
‘‘system 1’’ purportedly emphasizing automatic, implicit, fast,
nonconscious and emotional processing, and a ‘‘system 2’’emphasizing the complements of these attributes (Evans,
2008). Within social cognition, the emphasis has been on
a distinction between explicit and implicit processing, borrowing
from social psychology, which has long emphasized the implicit
nature of social attributions (Frith and Frith, 2008). The distinction
has been linked to some extent also to self-referential and meta-
cognitive abilities, partitioning the processing into ‘‘reflexive’’
versus ‘‘reflective’’ (Lieberman, 2007). While these dichotomies
have been useful in nucleating research topics, there is a paucity
of arguments or empirical data to suggest that they are the only
or the best way of carving up the processing, and it seems
doubtful that the often long lists of correlated attributes should
come as a package, except insofar as they are semantically
related to begin with. However, there are few alternative
schemes currently available, and the effort has instead focused
on how to generate the richness and diversity of social cognition
from combining the two types of processing. This ranges from
thinking of them as mostly in opposition to one another (one
can override the other) (Frith and Frith, 2008) to assigning them
to distinct temporal components of social information process-
ing to considering them as dynamically iterative (Cunningham
and Zelazo, 2007).
One likely fallacy promoted by dual-process theories of social
cognition is the idea that the two sets of processes constitute
coherent systems of some kind. The set of attributes listed for
one side of the dual-process dichotomy is typically simply the
complement of the other; but definition by exclusion need not
delineate any inherently related set of attributes (Keren and
Schul, 2009). Take memory as a good example: declarative
memory has been fairly cohesively defined and specific neural
structures in the medial temporal lobe have been shown to be
most important for it (although there is of course further fraction-
ation within the domain of declarative memory, as well as
continuing debates about how best to define its essential
computational properties). By contrast, nondeclarative memory,
defined by exclusion, is heterogeneous, including priming,
Pavlovian conditioning, operant conditioning, motor learning,
and so on. The situation with dual-process theories is even
worse, since counterexamples to the proposed co-occurrence
of attributes are easy to think of. Fast, nonconscious, and
emotional attributes of ‘‘system 1’’ are a good example. There
are many instances of each of these attributes within behaviors
more typically associated with ‘‘system 2.’’
Where does this leave dual-process theories of social cogni-
tion? One original conception (controlled versus automatic
[Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977]) may still be the most useful and
may isolate one particular aspect of social cognition: controlled,
volitional, effortful, reflective processing (Lieberman, 2007). This
aspect of social cognition is most perspicuous in adult humans,
and some of its neural substrates in the prefrontal cortex have
been the topic of intense investigation. It is possible that this
metacognitive ability requires conscious awareness. It is unclear
that it requiresmany of the other attributes, and it is unclear that it
serves to nucleate a ‘‘system’’ of any sort, let alone specify
a complementary one. To summarize this section: the process
architecture of social cognition is still very much in need of
a detailed theory, and alternatives to dual-process models
should be pursued.Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 759
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Finally, even if and when we have sufficiently detailed data from
functional neuroanatomy, andeven if andwhenwehave amature
social cognitive psychology of the relevant processes to bemap-
ped, we need to ask what kind of relationship such a mapping
should fall under. This question is acute, since despite the fact
that neither brain circuits nor psychological processes are yet
well delineated, the main enterprise of cognitive neuroscience,
including social cognitive neuroscience, has in fact been to
map the one onto the other. This is not as ill-founded an
endeavor as it seems, since it may well be that it is only through
iterative attempts at such mappings that we can identify what
should be mapped in the first place; our understanding of mind
and brain will come as a package.
Mapping social cognition onto the social brain often takes
a subtractive strategy. For instance, in a seminal initial study of
the brain regions that underly face processing, people were
shown pictures of faces while fMRI data were acquired. The
brain activation seen under this condition was then compared
to a large number of other stimulus conditions that attempted
to make comparisons and control for possible confounds,
such as inverted faces, scrambled faces, hands, objects, and
so on (Kanwisher et al., 1997). Recent fMRI studies in social
neuroscience often compare social and nonsocial stimuli, as in
the previous example, but they also compare social and nonso-
cial tasks. Some manipulate both: for instance, participants are
asked to form impressions of the stimuli they see or to remember
their order of presentation (social versus nonsocial task) with
respect to sentences describing people or objects (social versus
nonsocial stimuli) (Mitchell et al., 2005). Such approaches have
found good evidence that knowledge about people and objects
is generated through different neural substrates (Mitchell et al.,
2002), and there is now a large list of studies in a similar vein.
Needless to say, these subtractive approaches have some
limitations, since multiple differences distinguish the stimulus
and task conditions and it is impossible to conduct a subtraction
that is exhaustive. Another approach that may offer more insight
is quasiparametric: rather than a dichotomous contrast, several
levels of stimulus or task could be used. The challenge with this
approach is that it is not straightforward how to parameterize
a dimension of ‘‘socialness.’’
Ultimately, the mapping challenge can only be successful if it
is accompanied by a corresponding change in the level of expla-
nation of how stimuli link to behavior. This is not yet generally
accomplished in most studies. For instance, many fMRI studies
interpret activation in, for example, the insula or the ventral stria-
tum as corresponding to a ‘‘disgust’’ or ‘‘reward’’ response, and
explain behavior accordingly, examples of so-called ‘‘reverse
inference’’ (Poldrack, 2006). Not only is this often unjustified, it
is not really progress: the emotions thought to motivate behav-
iors have now simply been transposed into the brain, without
any new insight into the underlying mechanisms. It will be a chal-
lenge for future studies to pay attention to this issue and to derive
from the data a level of explanation at the process level that goes
beyond the processes hypothesized at the outset.
It is possible to have a more paradigm-shifting view of how the
mapping of mind to brain might proceed. Even once we have
a useful, predictive process architecture for social cognition,760 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.many of those processes may map onto the brain only partly
and disjunctively. Conversely, if we pick a brain ‘‘system,’’
however defined, and ask what it does, the answer may end
up being a hodge-podge of different processes. The hope is
that such a situation would force us to reconsider the processes
and come up with a computational theory that meshes better
with the neuroscience. One would look toward the success in
some parts of sensory neuroscience, where sophisticated
ways of formulating and evaluating competing models lead to
descriptions of which partition of a stimulus space is represented
by a region or certain neurons in the brain (Wu et al., 2006). Some
meta-analytic approaches are beginning to provide pictures in
this spirit also for aspects of social neuroscience, such as
answers to the question, ‘‘What activates the amygdala’’?
(Costafreda et al., 2008).
Even if we eventually come upwith a computational account of
how the social brain works that is truly aligned with the neurosci-
ence data, it remains an open question what such an account
would look like. It is possible that it would be so different from
our intuitive categories for social behavior that it would literally
be something that we could not presently understand. This is
not necessarily because social cognition is inherently any more
difficult to map onto the brain than any other aspect of percep-
tion or cognition. The problem is rather that we have an intuitive,
‘‘folk,’’ understanding that grounds our theories of social
behavior. The reason we can understand what social psycholo-
gists, or social neuroscientists, are talking about, is that the
concepts used are to some extent continuous with our common-
sense understanding of ourminds and theminds of other people.
If we have to jettison that continuity, wemay end up with a theory
of social behavior very different from the one we currently use in
everyday life. On the other hand, the picture of the physical world
that quantum mechanics provides shares these same consider-
ations, and it is an intriguing possibility that a future social neuro-
science would literally allow us to understand ourselves in an
entirely different way.
To summarize this section: mapping social processing onto
social brain structuresmay be an iterative way tomake progress,
bootstrapping our understanding of both even though each
requires revision. Varying the social nature of stimuli and pro-
cessing demands has begun to produce such mappings,
although it remains a big open question what its endpoint might
look like.
Future Challenges
The quick tour of the terrain in social neurosciencewe have taken
so far points to some key open questions that future studies will
need to consider and from which springs much of the current
excitement in social neuroscience (Table 2). These revisit several
of the points we raised earlier and serve to summarize and brain-
storm for experiments to be done.
Isolating the Social
As we just discussed, social stimuli, and social tasks, inherently
contain multiple properties. Which are unique to the social
domain? If not unique, which sets of properties taken jointly
can be used to isolate the social? This set of questions has
a long history rooted in debates about the domain-specificity
of social cognition. The most detailed empirical investigation
Table 2. Open Questions
A Partial Sampling of Big Conceptual Questions for Social Neuroscience
1. What are the social processes? In particular, are they computationally distinct from those that process nonsocial information? Are there a set of
processes that delineate the ‘‘social mind,’’ analogously to how there might be a set of structures for the ‘‘social brain’’? Social psychology has
generated a number of candidates, but it is unclear how these will be incorporated into a future social neuroscience.
2. What is the social brain? Is there even a ‘‘social brain,’’ a set of structures specifying a neural system for processing social information? Key
structures proposed include parts of the temporal cortex (fusiform gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and sulcus) involved in aspects of social
perception, medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction involved in theory of mind, and posterior cingulate and medial parietal cortex
involved in perspective taking and self-reflection.
3. Is there specialization for social processing below the systems level of question 2? Von Economo neurons, a particular morphological cell type
found in frontoinsular cortex in apes and humans (as well as some whales and elephants) have been proposed to subserve the long-distance
signaling that underlies integration of information from spatially distal parts of the brain necessary for social cognition (Allman et al., 2002). Oxytocin
has been proposed as a key neuromodulator for affiliative social behaviors in mammals; receptor subtypes for several biogenic amines such as
serotonin have also been noted to subserve important roles in social processing. These findings in particular have great promise for
pharmacological intervention of psychiatric illnesses affecting social functioning.
4.What social abilitiesmight be impossible for humans? The flip-side of the question of which social abilities are unique to humans is the question of
whether there is anything we could not learn to do. Could we all learn to live together in peace and cooperation, or would our very cognitive flexibility
always preclude anything approaching eusocial collective behavior? This question could also be seen as related to a question about the bounds of
cognitive and emotional regulation: if we realized the metacognitive need for a particular social behavior, do we have the control to implement it
volitionally?
5. How could we best change our social behavior? Questions 3 and 4 point toward this question but neglect the role of context and our power to
modify our environment. Rather than trying to change the way our brains work, we could think about changing our environmental and social context
so as to change our social behavior. Clever changes in public policies (such as incorporating neuroscience data together with tools from
mechanism design to achieve optimal public goods compliance [Krajbich et al., 2009]), ubiquitous education, and strategic design of economic and
political structures could all contribute toward such a goal in principle.
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on the one side that face perception features specialized
psychological and neurobiological properties (Kanwisher and
Yovel, 2006), and on the other side that it is a by-product of
more general computational processing with demands that are
not specific to the domain of faces (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000).
Attempts to isolate ‘‘social’’ processing typically proceed by
holding stimuli constant and asking participants to engage in
either a social (evaluative) or nonsocial task; or hold the task
constant and vary the stimuli (social versus nonsocial). As we
noted above, the challenge is in trying to isolate the social
aspects from associated processing that is general: social
stimuli may attract more attention, induce more emotional
arousal, be more distinctive, and so on and so forth. One recent
example is the question of whether or not social reward is pro-
cessed in the same way as nonsocial reward. The question is
part of the larger question that decision scientists are asking,
whether there is a common currency for processing all different
types of reward, such asmoney, food, or friendly people. Several
studies have now compared social and monetary reward and
generally produced conclusions that social reward overlaps at
least partly with monetary reward in its neural implementation
(Izuma et al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008), supplementing findings
that social feedback (the reliability of information from other
people) could be processed by associative mechanisms similar
to reward feedback (Behrens et al., 2008), and revisiting the
points we noted earlier in our discussion of neuroeconomics.
Yet confounds remain, because however the distinction
between social and nonsocial is made by the experimenter, it
consists of a large number of correlated attributes. This is not
necessarily a problem for distinguishing social from nonsocial
processing, but it pushes the question to a level deeper: weknow that social and nonsocial cognition differ, at least to
some extent. The question now is: why? Is it because social
stimuli are less predictable? Is it because they are more salient?
Is it because they are more emotionally arousing? These ques-
tions bring us back to the old debate about the domain speci-
ficity of face perception and confront us with the same dilemma.
Either social cognition just poses a correlated set of computa-
tional demands, and is typically associated with a correlated
set of effects, none of which are unique to social information;
or else social cognition is domain specific, but it is difficult to
isolate what the essential feature might be.
Uniquely Human Social Cognition
One of the motivating questions we considered above was the
fascination of why humans appear so different from all other
animals, behaviorally and in terms of relative brain size, a differ-
ence that is most frequently presumed to be traced to our
different social cognition (Dunbar, 1998; Humphrey, 1976).
Comparative studies provide a rich set of data to address this
issue (see Byrne and Bates [this issue of Neuron]), and social
neuroscience has hypothesized some specific mechanisms
and corresponding brain structures (Saxe, 2006a).
Developmental and comparative psychology has been stress-
ing social learning mechanisms that may be unique to humans
(Herrmann et al., 2007), although little is yet known about their
neural basis. The findings emphasize the critical need for social
context during early development. For instance, infants require
the social presence of a person in order to learn early aspects
of language (merely listening to the voice played from a tape
recorder is not enough) (Kuhl et al., 2003). Social learning in hu-
mans is predicated on the expectation that others are interested
in teaching and features generic-level knowledge that can be
acquired through ostensive signals (Csibra and Gergely, 2009).Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 761
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learning mechanisms seen in other species, but humans may
be unique in this respect. Interestingly, our closest living rela-
tives, the great apes, may not be all that adept at learning from
ostension, but dogs are (Miklo´si et al., 2003).
Ultimately, one would want to link social cognitive abilities
unique to humans to their correlates in the brain and in the
genome. Of particular interest here would be comparative
studies between humans and chimpanzees. There are now a
number of behavioral studies (e.g., by Michael Tomasello and
others at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig), but very few neuro-
biological studies due to the difficulty of doing neuroscience in
chimpanzees (see Parr et al., 2009, for an exception). With the
recent sequencing of the chimpanzee genome, genetic differ-
ences can be pinpointed. It is of particular interest to note that
there appear to be genes important for social cognition on the
sex chromosomes (Skuse, 2006) and that both X (Khaitovich
et al., 2005) and Y chromomosomes (Hughes et al., 2010) have
diverged considerably between the two species (about 1/3 of
the sequences of the male-specific region of the Y chromosome
have no clear counterpart in the other species, for example).
The cognitive abilities of many other species can be impres-
sive. For instance, chimpanzees can perform better than humans
on some types of working memory tasks (Inoue andMatsuzawa,
2007), cephalopods (octopi, cuttlefish, squid) can camouflage
themselves in the most clever ways (Hanlon, 2007), and corvids
(jays and crows) take into account social observation, context,
and time in caching food (Emery and Clayton, 2009). What differs
in all these cases and human cognition is flexibility: we can typi-
cally apply many abilities to an unlimited number of different
contexts, while other animals show more narrowly specialized
abilities that cannot be transferred as easily to other domains.
What brain mechanisms mediate this flexibility? Is it the way
the components are interconnected? Is it due to an added
‘‘executive’’ metacognitive component? Both of these have
been highlighted in a recent lesion study of the neuroanatomical
substrates for general intelligence (Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
A perhaps related feature of human social cognition is the
ability to exercise volitional control at multiple levels, so as to
take into account a broader context. For instance, humans
more so than other animals can forego a smaller immediate
reward in order to obtain a larger future reward (a phenomenon
economists have termed ‘‘temporal discounting’’), an effect of
the future timeframe on subjective valuation that correlates
with neural signals in valuation regions of the brain such as the
medial prefrontal cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Humans
more so than other animals can regulate their emotional
responses to one another in a strategic way; and humans will
control their behavior to take into account the social context. A
recent example of this is the finding that temporary disruption
of activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex influences
people’s ability to build a good reputation. In that study,
participants had to inhibit a prepotent strategy to behave
selfishly if they wanted to obtain a good social reputation. This
ability was impaired with repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) of the right prefrontal cortex. The finding is
in line with a larger literature suggesting that this region of the
brain is important for cognitive and emotional control and serves762 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.as a nice example of the importance that such control plays
in regulating complex, planned, social behavior. It may be
particularly this effortful, explicit component of social cognition
that is elaborated in humans and that can regulate more auto-
matic, implicit social cognition (Frith and Frith, 2008) (if we are
willing to slide for the moment into the dual-process scheme
for carving up cognitive processes). Another region highlighted
in the higher-order control of behavior is the frontopolar cortex
(Brodmann’s Area 10), the very anterior region of the prefrontal
cortex and the sector that shows the biggest relative increase
between great apes and humans (Semendeferi et al., 2001).
This region of the brain has been implicated by fMRI studies in
keeping track of alternative courses of action and in motivating
people to switch from one strategy to another when they feel
that the current one is no longer the best (Boorman et al.,
2009; Daw et al., 2006).
If the social cognitive abilities of modern humans are adaptive,
it is somewhat puzzling that no other species appears to have
evolved them. Clearly, there must be some costs associated
with evolving those abilities. One obvious cost is the need for
a large brain, metabolically expensive, time-intensive to train
up, and difficult to give birth to biomechanically. There is another
more intriguing conjecture: that some uniquely human aspects of
cognition are potentially deleterious to the survival of the
species. A recent letter to the editor in Nature hypothesized
that full self-awareness brings knowledge of one’s own mortality
(and, for that matter, of one’s kin and one’s species), a possibly
fatal piece of knowledge, full understanding of which would
preclude any motivation to survive. The hypothesis continues
that self-awareness could only have arisen in tandemwithmech-
anisms such as faith and religion, which deny the existence of
mortality and whose absence blocked the evolution of full self-
awareness in all other species (Varki, 2009).
Effects of Context, Development, and Individual
Differences
Historically, psychology sought to identify universals across
different people. While that is still one theme, the tide has now
turned to an emphasis on individual differences in the context
of particular cultures and in the context of development. The
stress of the role of development and environment has long
been an emphasis in social psychology, but its translation to
more cognitive and biological studies is a new theme. A good
example here is the perception of emotions from facial expres-
sions. Beginning with early observations by Charles Darwin
(Darwin, 1965), psychologists in the 1970s and onward had
argued (albeit not without heated debate) that this ability was
universal across all human cultures (Ekman, 1994, 1973).
Furthermore, it was assumed that there were similarly universal
mechanisms at the level of brain and eye movements during
the viewing of faces—although little had been done here in terms
of cultural comparisons, there were data from nonhuman
primates showing similarities to humans (Gothard et al., 2004;
Keating and Keating, 1982). But more recent studies show
specific cultural differences: Eastern Asian people, for instance,
make more confusions between fear and disgust expressions
that can be traced to a different pattern of fixations onto the
faces, compared to Western Caucasian people (Blais et al.,
2008; Jack et al., 2009).
Neuron
ReviewNeuroscience studies of cultural differences in social cognition
are very difficult to carry out with precision in isolating the source
of the ‘‘cultural’’ differences. Technically, one would want to
manipulate independently at least three different potential sour-
ces of variability, which are confounded in most studies: (1)
differences in race (e.g., Asian versus Caucasian), (2) differences
in cultural environment that the person grew up in (e.g., born and
raised in Japan versus born and raised in America), and (3)
differences in the environment in which the testing is done
(e.g., being scanned by Japanese researchers in a lab in Tokyo
versus being scanned by American researchers in a lab in Los
Angeles). This 23 23 2 design would help pinpoint the sources
of possible differences, although even this would leave
open further questions since all three factors are themselves
complex. For instance, factor (1) consists of genetic effects
that constitute race, and genetic effects correlated with race:
the serotonin reuptake transporter polymorphism (5-HTTLPR,
a polymorphism that has generated a large literature on its
effects on emotion-related processing) differs systematically
between Japanese and European populations, with the short
allele considerably more prevalent in Japanese populations
(70% versus 40% [Kim et al., 2007; Nakamura et al., 2000]).
Factor (2) poses challenges nowadays since most people
move from place to place during their lifetime and because
cultures are no longer isolated from one another. For instance,
it has been reported that Caucasian subjects show different acti-
vation of the amygdala by fear faces when these are shown on
Asian or on Caucasian faces—but if Caucasian subjects had
spent some time living in Japan, this pattern changed (Moriguchi
et al., 2005). The role of language in shaping cognition has a long
history with perhaps some of the clearest findings coming from
studies showing that names for colors influence color categori-
zation and discrimination (Berlin and Kay, 1991; Winawer et al.,
2007). The dynamic effects of cultural environment are even
more profound than these studies would suggest. In fact,
responses to faces can change nearly instantaneously depend-
ing on what social group one identifies with (Van Bavel et al.,
2008). With respect to factor (3) it seems likely that different
testing environments will introduce yet another source of vari-
ability, a point long known from behavioral studies in mice
(Crabbe et al., 1999). These considerations suggest that cultural
neuroscience is wide open for detailed investigation, with a rich
array of effects and interactions to be discovered—but care and
effort will be required to tease them out.
In humans, a contextual challenge particularly acute for
studies of social behavior is that participants in an experiment
nearly always have knowledge that this is an experiment, with
all the assumptions, expectations, and biases that this knowl-
edge introduces. Other animals typically require no elaborate
deceptions and treat all experiments like the real thing. A
good example of the powerful effects of people’s beliefs on
social behavior is provided in a recent study of the effects of
testosterone on social behavior in bargaining situations.
Women who were given testosterone showed fairer bargaining
behavior, somewhat counterintuitively. However, women given
placebo who believed they had been given testosterone also
showed a change in bargaining behavior—but in the opposite
direction: they were less fair in their behavior, in linewith people’s stereotypes about the effects of testosterone
(Eisenegger et al., 2010).
Limits and Applications of Social Neuroscience
What are the limits of what social neuroscience can investigate?
Are there limits to what it should? And how can we use it to make
the world a better place? This final set of questions of course
does not admit of much in terms of an answer yet, but this should
not stop us from speculating.
With respect to the first question, a healthy optimism would
suggest no limits in principle: social neuroscience is the way to
understand all social behavior. However, this optimism should
be tempered with interdisciplinary tolerance, since fields from
other social sciences, from engineering, and from computer
science will certainly all have something to contribute. Especially
some of the nonclinical applications of social neuroscience
will need to liaise closely with these other disciplines: recom-
mendations for public policy or designs for better social
computer interfaces and intelligent robots are all issues on the
not-too-distant horizon. None of them can be addressed by
social neuroscience alone.
Some of these examples may seem more like science fiction,
but they are here already. For instance, a recent study consid-
ered cooperative behavior in the context of public goods
(Krajbich et al., 2009). A mathematically and empirically solid
result from the field of mechanism design had long shown that
certain public goods problems were intractable: no incentives
were possible that would result in stably optimal compliance to
contribute to the good. The study used fMRI decoding methods
to ‘‘read-out’’ the value that a particular option had for the partic-
ipant and used this value in setting the public goods policy.
Participants were informed of this effect, with the result that
perfect compliance was achieved, a result that was previously
considered impossible.
Examples like this, however, raise the second question: do
we want this kind of contribution from social neuroscience?
Objections trace back to our deep-seated mistrust of biologi-
cally deterministic accounts that seem to challenge our
freedom. The reaction to some of the recent attempts to deter-
mine from neuroimaging data whether people are lying or telling
the truth, or what their political beliefs are, illustrate the point
(e.g., Aron et al., 2007). Of course, scientists typically do not
cite offense to their sense of liberty as the reason and instead
produce (valid) arguments about the flawed methodology, typi-
cally pointing out that one cannot determine anything with
statistical reliability from an individual’s brain and that at best
group effects can be shown. And group effects have indeed
been shown: there are differences in judgments of competence
(Todorov et al., 2005) and in brain responses (Spezio et al.,
2008) when people view the faces of (unfamiliar) politicians
who have lost real elections as compared to faces of (unfamiliar)
politicians who have won real elections. There are psychophys-
iological differences between liberal and conservative groups
(Oxley et al., 2008). There are legal implications about social
psychological (Gray et al., 2003) and neuroscience data (Greene
et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007) regarding people’s sense of
right and wrong. It is just a matter of time before the signal-
to-noise ratio of the methods allows us to make statements at
the level of the individual, and so it is indeed time to beginNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 763
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from social neuroscience.
These last considerations also stress the impact that social
neuroscience is likely to have—on domains ranging from the
clinical to engineering to legal. This is part of whatmakes the field
so exciting and what is drawing in young scientists from such
diverse backgrounds. While I have highlighted many of the chal-
lenges faced by the field, these are being tackled with vigor.
Perhaps one closing caveat would be in order: social neurosci-
ence is so successful that it is at risk of losing its roots. It will
be important to continue to collaborate closely with neurobiolo-
gists working in all species of animals, not just humans, just as it
will be important to collaborate with social psychologists. And
debate and discussion requires input from all relevant fields,
including philosophy, psychology, biology, economics, and
computer science. Social neuroscience straddles many disci-
plines, but it needs all of them in order to address the conceptual
issues I have discussed here.
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